Chinese Spy: “No! I was not spying for China!”

The brutal and aggressive Chinese Communist Party has had their hands firmly dipped into Britain’s intellectual property for decades due to politicians like David Cameron and John Osborne stupidly inviting the Chinese into the UK without compunction. Chinese spies have even infiltrated parliament, invited by Cameron and Osborne during their flaccid tenure. Lax security and negligent government officials have basically held an open door policy for Chinese agents spying for China. Today, you can’t throw a chopstick without hitting a Chinese spy, who are literally everywhere.

CHINA THREAT

Because of the economic hold over the West, and billions in the economy tied to China, the government and UK businesses have turned a blind eye to the blatant espionage and the horrific genocide of the Uighur people in China.

Will things ever change? Will the UK ever wake up to being bent over a table and fucked up the arse by a laughing China? Probably not is the answer, because as mentioned before the Chinese have infiltrated the UK economy to such an extent much like a parasite, it would be terminal to expel or limit the spies who are firmly positioned in every UK institution, company and government.

State Security Ministry

IPA: is the principal civilian intelligence, security and secret police agency of the People’s Republic of China, responsible for foreign intelligence, counter-intelligence, and the political security of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Chinese spy network is an all encompassing network invited into the UK by Tony Blair, David Cameron and George Osborne.

Within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), intelligence organizations fall under the General Staff Department (the Second and Third Departments, or, respectively, China’s MI5 and MI6 equivalents); the General Political Department for intelligence and covert influence operations; the PLA Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery headquarters; and technical reconnaissance bureaus in the military regions. Much of the military intelligence infrastructure is based in China, but defence attachés and clandestine collectors do operate abroad, including from the service intelligence elements.

Chinese tourism has skyrocketed since the 1980s, as well as foreign students shipped to UK universities to collect important data to send to Beijing. Tourists are a great way of gathering data as they are given free rein in the West, as well as students who target scientific research facilities. For the collection of technology, spies working under the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (ISTIC) infiltrate the West for the collection and cataloguing of foreign scientific publications and other sensitive information. Chinese researchers are able to gather crucial research materials and briefing packets on the state of the field as they please. ISTIC was instrumental in developing graduate programs with top universities in informatics, convening professional associations, and relinquishing professional literature — the hallmarks of an insidious network dedicated to stealing data with impunity. The ISTIC system credits the acquisition of foreign technological information with reducing research costs in China by 40 to 50 percent and research time by 60 to 70 percent, thanks to the plundering of foreign intellectual data.